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Abstract
As several European countries debate entering, or exiting, the Euro, a key policy ques-
tion is how much currency unions (CUs) affect trade. Recently, Glick and Rose (2016)
confirmed that currency unions increase trade on average by 100%, and that the Euro
has increased trade by a still-large 50%. In this paper, we find that the apparent large
impact of CUs on trade is driven by other major geopolitical events correlated with
CU switches, including communist takeovers, decolonization, warfare, ethnic cleansing
episodes, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the whole history of European integration. We
find that moving from robust standard errors to multi-way clustered errors alone reduces
the t-score of the Euro impact by 75%. Looking at individual CUs, we find that in no
cases does the time series evidence support a large trade effect, and that the effect breaks
particularly badly once we find suitable control groups. Overall, we find that intuitive
controls and omitting the CU switches coterminous with war and missing data render
the trade impact of the Euro and all CUs together statistically insignificant.
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Greek GDP is currently 26% below its 2007 peak. The economies of Portugal, Spain,
and Italy, are still 4%, 8%, and 7%, respectively, smaller in 2016 than their pre-2008 re-
cession peaks.1 Despite the continued poor economic performance and obvious problems
with surrendering control of one’s domestic monetary policy, the Euro Zone has contin-
ued to grow in size, as Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), and Lithuania
(2015) have all recently joined the Euro, while others still appear to be debating entry,
even if it now appears increasingly unlikely.2 While questions of politics and identity
may be the driving force behind the enlargement of the Euro Zone, particularly since
the EU has seemed intent on requiring usage of the Euro as a condition for entering the
EU, another reason is surely that these countries want to foster closer trade ties with
Western Europe.
And, according to recent research Glick and Rose (2016) (hereafter GR), countries
would be justified in believing that Euro membership leads to significant trade integra-
tion.3 Using panel data with a dummy for currency unions, GR estimate that, overall,
CUs increase trade 100%, while the Euro has increased trade by a still-impressive 50%.
This suggests that the benefits of joining a currency union are real, and perhaps large
enough to outweigh the detrimental effect of ceding control over one’s domestic mone-
tary policy, other benefits of the Euro (such as freer financial flows) notwithstanding.
GR also find that not all CUs increase trade – the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union
decreased trade by 80%, while US dollar unions have no effect. These heterogeneous
effects constitute a puzzle in need of an explanation.
In this paper, we subject these findings to a number of robustness checks. First, we
consider each disaggregated CU separately, plotting the pre- and post-treatment trend of
each major union. We search for a suitable control group for each CU switch, similar in
spirit to the “matching” approach implemented by Persson (2001). We try to understand
what other major geopolitical events may be correlated with changes in CU status. In
1. Computed using annual data from Eurostat data via FRED. For each country, peak GDP was
taken from 2007 or 2008, and compared to 2016. While this period has been christened the “Lesser
Depression”, the fact remains that the economic performance was worse than it was during the Great
Depression. Many economists have noted parallels, faulting the “Cross of Euros” as a modern-day
golden straitjacket, particularly as the difficulties of one monetary policy for all became more apparent
with the divergent fortunes of the north and south in wake of the Great Recession.
2. Countries that have contemplated joining within the last few years include Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, and Poland.
3. Holding fixed the author, Glick (2017) argues for a Euro effect 25% smaller than GR (2016),
while Glick and Rose (2016)(b), which pre-dated GR (2016), found that the impact of CUs on trade
is sensitive to the specification. Other recent papers that find a positive impact include Kunroo et
al. (2016), Camarero et al. (2014), Felbermayr et al. (2017), Gunnella et al. (2015), Gil-Pareja et
al. (2008), Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen (2017), and Rotili et al. (2014), while Macedoni (2017)
finds evidence consistent with the Euro reducing trade costs.
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the second part of our paper, adopt a holistic panel regression approach similar to GR
(2016), using what we have learned in individual CU cases, to test the robustness of the
currency union effect on trade. We find that the CU effect is driven by omitted variables
including warfare and communist takeovers, CU switches with missing data, and is
sensitive to including additional control variables. In addition, multi-way clustering can
reduce t-scores by as much as 75%, as in the case of the Euro. Overall, we arrive at a
point estimate of CUs on trade of about 5%, but with standard errors of 6%. We caution
that our estimates are still likely to suffer from non-random selection of countries in and
out of currency unions, which could bias the results in either direction. Our main finding
is that the apparent large impact of currency unions on trade continues to “break badly”
when confronted with rather mild controls. Thus, countries on the European periphery
should not expect large trade effects of adopting the Euro.
As an example of the endogeneity driving the result, consider the case of India and
Pakistan. At first glance, it may look – to one unfamiliar with their history – like a
textbook case in which a currency union dissolution crippled trade (see Figure 1), as
bilateral trade fell by 99.8%. However, the dissolution occurred simultaneously with the
outbreak of a brutal border over the legacy of partition, while political relations between
the two countries remain frigid to this day.4 In addition, all of the countries which left
the French Franc – Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco – did so after major conflicts resulting
in independence.5 These included separatist bombings in the case of Tunisia, a war
of independence in the Algerian case, and anti-colonial rioting in Morocco. All five of
Portugal’s former colonies which had also shared currency unions likewise had to fight
for their independence, some of which included prolonged guerrilla wars.6
Endogeneity and third factors also play a role in the Euro. The whole history of
European integration, from the Coal and Steel Community, to the Fall of the Berlin Wall
and the formation of the EU, implies that there are other reasons, aside from the Euro,
why European trade has increased over time. Thus, our approach is to compare Western
European countries which joined the Euro to those that did not (and, Western European
countries which joined the Euro with those that joined the EU). Similarly, for Eastern
European Euro entrants (by 2013), we use as a control group other Eastern European
countries which either joined the Euro later (Latvia and Lithuania), or are otherwise
similar. We find no evidence that the Euro significantly increased trade compared to
4. See Prasad, The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (2011).
5. See Thom and Walsh (2002).
6. See, for example, Venter, Portugal’s Guerrilla Wars in Africa: Lisbon’s Three Wars in Angola,
Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea 1961-74, (2013). Note that Cape Verde was also part of the
Guinea-Bissauan War of Independence.
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Figure 1: Indo-Pakistani Trade: A Textbook Case of the CU Effect or Endogeneity?
Notes: This figure plots bilateral trade over time for India and Pakistan, one of the CUs in the GR
(2016) data. These countries exited a shared currency union in 1965, after which trade plummeted.
However, this was the same year as the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 following Pakistan’s Operation
Gibraltar.
the most reasonable control groups.
This literature began with A. Rose (2000), who found that CUs triple trade. This
effect sounded suspiciously large to some7, and so a subsequent literature set out to
dampen the effect, with titles such as “Honey I Shrunk the Currency Union Effect on
Trade” (Nitsch (2002)).8 However, Rose would typically respond with larger data sets,
as Glick and Rose (2002) found that currency unions double trade in a time series setting
even when including country-pair fixed effects.9
Nevertheless, doubts remained.10 Nitsch (2005) found no impact for CU entries,
Klein (2005) found no trade effect of dollarization episodes, and Bomberger (2003) found
that a simple time trend eliminated the effect for the UK colonial sample (one-fifth of
the total switches in GR 2002). Thom and Walsh (2002) noted that many CU exits
7. Including to Rose himself, who once wrote “I have always maintained that the measured effect of
a single currency on trade appears implausibly large...”
8. Additionally, Persson (2001) and Pakko and Wall (2001) followed Rose’s (2000) original paper but
predated GR (2002) and greatly reduce or eliminate the estimated impact on smaller datasets.
9. The result appeared robust enough that in 2005, Harvard’s Jeff Frankel called Rose’s discovery of
the large apparent impact of CUs on trade the most significant finding in International Macroeconomics
in the preceding ten years. On the other hand, worried about the endogenous nature of CUs, Alesina
et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) opted for geographic instrumental variable approaches,
and found that CUs actually increase trade on a 14-fold and a 7-fold basis.
10. For example, Baldwin (2006) wrote a nice overview of the literature to that point, discussing
several reasons why not to trust the larger impacts of currency unions on trade, and concluded that
the Euro might have increased trade by a still sizeable 5-10%. Additionally, Bun and Klaassen (2007)
include dynamic controls and shrinks the CU impact to a still substantial 25%, and precisely estimated.
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had obvious omitted variables such as wars of independence and communist takeovers.
Berger and Nitsch (2008) considered early evidence on the Euro, and argued that, given
the long history of European trade integration, the key question is whether the Euro
increased trade relative to the long-run trend, and found that it did not.11 Klein and
Shambaugh (2006) found that hard currency pegs have a much smaller impact on trade
than currency unions, and that indirect pegs – which are much more likely to be random
– have no effect on trade at all.
These insights paved the way for Campbell (2013), who showed that the apparent
impact of CUs on trade was sensitive to: (a) excluding the CU observations coterminous
with other major political events or missing data, (b) including a UK colony time trend,
and (c) clustering the standard errors. Campbell also found that much of the impact
was suspiciously driven by a decline in trade in the last 10 years before CUs had even
dissolved. Thus, controlling for the negative pre-trend, one could arrive at point esti-
mates of CUs on trade which are negative and insignificant. However, GR (2016) once
again responded with a larger data set updated to 2013 (from 1997), as it included data
on 423 switches instead of 136 used in GR (2002).12
This paper is the first to use this much larger dataset and test whether the apparent
large impact of CUs on trade is driven by other major geopolitical factors. Compared
to Campbell (2013), we also study individual CUs at length, plotting the pre- and post-
treatment trends for each, in order to find omitted variables and suitable control groups.
In addition, we also implement multi-way clustered standard errors, and implement
Importer*Year and Exporter*Year FEs in a specification using directional exports, all
of which Campbell (2013) does not do. While some other studies also find no effect of
the Euro (Nähle (2015), Tykkyläinen (2012), and Figueiredo et al. (2016))13, A. K. Rose
(2017) argues in a meta-analysis that the reason that some Euro studies find smaller,
no, or even a negative impact is that they use either fewer countries or fewer years. By
contrast, we show that the key is really controlling for other key aspects of European
11. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009) also found no effect of the euro on trade. In a meta-analysis,
Havránek (2010) found systematic evidence of publication bias for the euro studies, and a mean impact
of just 3.8% versus over 60% for earlier non-euro episodes. De Sousa (2012) argued that the impact
of CUs on trade has dampened over time due to improvements in financial technology, yet there was
also little measured impact in the prewar era according to Wolf and Ritschl (2011). López-Córdova and
Meissner (2003) find mixed support.
12. The authors should further be commended for plotting pre- and post-treatment trends, and for
adopting a new specification with one-directional exports as the dependent variable while controlling
for importer*year and exporter*year interactive fixed effects.
13. In a nice test, Martínez-Zarzoso (2017) finds no evidence in the aggregate of trade between African
countries pegged to the Franc and EMU countries. Mika and Zymek (2017) focuses on late entrants
using data from 1992-2013 using a PPML estimator (used also by GR (2016b)), arguing that the problem
is log-linear OLS. We show that even using log-linear OLS, the Euro effect is not robust.
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integration, as we use the same data as GR (2016).
In the rest of the paper, we first describe the data and methodology before examining
the disaggregated CUs in detail. Then, we proceed with a panel regression analysis.
1 Data
We use the same data set provided by Glick and Rose (2016), with trade data from the
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTs) between 1948 and 2013. Population and real
GDP data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, supplemented
with the Penn World Table v7.1 and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Glick
and Rose also took data on regional trade agreements from the World Trade Organiza-
tion. For consistency, we also use the same definition of currency union provided by GR:
“that money was interchangeable between the two countries at a 1:1 par for an extended
period of time, so that there was no need to convert prices when trading between a pair
of countries”. Currency union classification were taken by GR from the IMF – see 2016
for details.
Table 1 compares the number of CU switches in GR (2002) vs. GR (2016), for both
the Euro and non-Euro observations. GR (2002) had a total of 136 CU switches, 108
of which came from exits. Only 79 of these switches remained, however, after excluding
those switches with obvious large other geopolitical events, missing data, or colonial
histories. In GR (2016), this sample increases to 368. Thus, we have a much larger
sample of CU switches than Campbell (2013) had to consider the impact of CUs on
trade. Table 2 sums up switches and observations by disaggregated CU. The largest CU
in terms of separate country-pairs was actually the UK, followed by the EMU.
Lastly, Table 6 includes the list of 26 CUs coterminous with warfare or other major
geopolitical events from, and the description of events (from Campbell, 2013).
2 Methodology
GR (2002) and GR (2016) begin by estimating the following panel regression in levels:
ln(Tijt) = γCUijt + βZijt + γij + δt + ijt (2.1)
where Tijt is the average of bilateral imports and exports between country i and j at
time t reported by both countries, CUijt is a 0/1 dummy for currency union status, γij
is a country-pair FE, δt is a year FE, and Zijt includes several other controls. These
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Table 1: Number of Changes in Currency Union Status
GR 2002 GR 2016 GR 2016 (One-directional)
Entrants with Time Series Variation in Data 28 171 372
Exits with Time Series Variation in Data 108 252 558
Total Switches with Time Series Variation in Data 136 423 930
Missing Data Immediately Before or After Switch 0 79 214
War or Other Major Geopolitical Event 25 25 50
Switches ex Missing Data or War: 101 314 646
Switches ex Missing Data, War, or Former Colony: 79 290 588
Total Country Pairs: 11077 14801 34104
% of Country-Pairs with CUs: 1.86 3.54 3.46
Total Observations: 218,087 426,959 879,794
% of Observations with CUs: 1.45 1.74 1.95
Time Period 1948-1997 1948-2013 1948-2013
In the first column, the numbers of switches with time series variation represent the number
of switches for country-pairs with non-missing GDP product and bilateral trade for at least one
observation both in and out of a CU. For column (2) the same applies for both countries’ GDPs
and bilateral trade; for column (3) the only required non-missing variable is the (log) export value.
Table 2: Changes in CU Status by Currency Union
Currency Union GR 2002 GR 2016 GR 2016 (One-Directional) Observations (2016)
EMU 0 124 270 5024
CFA Franc 53 49 99 15062
ECCA 5 6 11 3062
Australia 2 3 6 1446
UK 25 150 308 14672
French Franc (pre-Euro) 3 2 26 1448
Indian Rupee 6 7 28 2280
US Dollar 4 40 77 5236
Portugal 4 12 22 860
Other CUs (ex-Portugal) 21 25 68 3744
Total 123 418 915 52834
This table plots numbers of country-pairs with at least one CU status switch (note that one country-
pair might have more than one switch, so that the totals here will not necessarily add up to the
above) with time series variation in data for disaggregated currency unions, requiring the same
non-missing variables as for Table 1.
include bilateral log GDP, log GDP per capita, a dummy for regional trade agreements,
and another dummy for current colonial status.
We modify this specification by introducing two new variables to control for country-
year-specific openness measures. The first control is the log of total exports for country
i (minus country i’s exports to j) plus total exports for country j (minus country j’s
exports to i). The second is the same measure, but for imports. The idea is to control
for general, year-specific measures of a country’s trade costs, since we are interested in
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isolating the impact of currency unions only on specific country-pair trade. We also
include controls for dummies for sovereignty of each country separately, which a priori
could be expected to be a mild control, yet we find to be influential in some cases.
GR (2016) additionally include a version of this model with richer importer-year and
exporter-year FEs, using one-way directional exports as the dependent variable:
ln(Xijt) = αCUijt + βZijt + λit + ψjt + γij + ijt, (2.2)
where Xijt is the average of exports from i to j reported by i and the same variable
reported by country j at time t. CUijt is a 0/1 dummy for currency union status, λit are
exporter-year interactive FEs, ψjt are importer-year interactive FEs, δij are country-pair
FEs, and Zijt are a number of other controls.
Equations 2.1 and 2.2 form our starting point. Equation 2.1 identifies the impact of
a currency union from the time series variation. It asks how much more do countries
trade after they join, or before they leave, a currency union. Thus, if countries join
a currency union precisely because they trade more, the country-pair fixed effect will
control for this. The second specification is similar, only now it asks how much more a
country will export to another country which shares a currency union, relative to other
exports for that country in a given year, and relative to their trading partner’s imports
in the same year. The problems with this methodology are two-fold. First, it neglects
dynamics. If two countries form a currency union, not just because they trade more, but
because their trade intensity is increasing over time, then this method will bias up the
results. The second (closely related) problem also stems from the non-random nature
of currency union formation. Sharing a currency union is likely to be a proxy for good,
or at least stable, political relations. Countries do not leave or form currency unions for
no reason. Often, as emphasized by Campbell (2013), currency union dissolutions are
associated with wars, the end of colonization, ethnic cleansing episodes, and financial or
currency crises.
A fundamental problem with running a massive panel regression with nearly a million
observations is that it can be a challenge to understand what is driving the results. Thus,
we start by considering each major CU separately in order to understand what potential
omitted variables and other factors may be influencing estimates for particular CUs.
This will help us find appropriate control groups, similar to the “matching” approach
which has been tried by others. In doing so, we will also look at the evolution of trade
growth before and after dissolution using equations 2.1 and 2.2, and also run some panel
regressions for some of the CUs individually, in order to confirm the intuition gained in
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the figures. Once we have examined each separate currency union, we’ll use what we’ve
learned in returning to a more holistic, general panel regression approach using the full
sample.
3 Disaggregating Currency Unions
3.1 The Euro
We start with the Euro, given that this represents 29% of the bilateral switches in
currency union status in the one-directional trade regressions with time series variation
in the data. Given the different histories of Western Europe and the former Warsaw
Pact entrants to the Euro, we consider each case separately, and then take what we
learn and move to a panel regression approach.
The differences between these two regions are stark. Among Western European coun-
tries, integration in the post-World War II period began in earnest with the European
Coal and Steel Community signed at the Treaty of Paris in 1951, the beginning of the
European Economic Community in 1958, the Schengen Agreement in 1985, and the
formation of the EU in 1993. Thus, the formation of the Euro can be viewed as the
culmination of decades of economic integration within Europe. In addition, trade was
disrupted during World War II, and thus, as Glick and Taylor (2010) and Campbell
(2010) argue, it naturally took decades for historical trade patterns to be reestablished,
while wartime animosities might also have depressed trade between, for example, France
and Germany for decades.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of former Warsaw Pact countries
to trade with the west was another seminal event which naturally would take decades to
play out in full. The history of trade integration in Eastern Europe took a very different
path than the rest of Europe, however, so we will consider Eastern Europe separately.
3.1.1 The Euro: Western Europe
We begin by simply plotting the evolution of trade intensity between Western European
countries that eventually joined the Euro over time, in Figure 2(a)14, from the following
gravity regression with annual Euro dummies:
ln(Tijt) = αt ∗ IEuroij + βZijt + γij + δt + ijt. (3.1)
14. I.e., it includes Austria, Germany, France, Belguim-Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy,
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Finland.
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This slight modification of equation 2.1 is a regression of bilateral trade Tijt on an-
nual dummies for country-pairs of countries that eventually joined the Euro (IEuroij ),
otherwise controlling for the same variables as in equation 2.1. We also run the com-
pletely analogous regression with Euro*year interactive dummies using the directional
export specification from equation 2.2, with the results displayed in Figure 2(b). In both
cases, all data for country-pairs with at least 40 data points are used to ensure that the
results are not driven by changes in the sample over time.
Figure 2(a) also compares the evolution among future Euro countries to all Western
European countries and all Western European EU countries, where both are residuals
from equation 3.1 plotted from separate regressions. The figure shows that there was
a steady increase in trade integration in Western Europe from 1950 to 1990, but that
trade then plateaued, or even declined thereafter. The coefficient of -1 in 1970 means
that countries that eventually joined the Euro traded about 63% less (=exp(-1)-1) than
they did in 1998 (the last year prior to the Euro), relative to what would have been
expected based on changes in GDP. Of course, if one ignores dynamics, and merely
takes an average of trade before and after, then one would find that trade was vastly
higher after the formation of the Euro. Yet, the timing of the increase in trade intensity
– from 1950 to 1990 – does not suggest that the formation of the Euro was a driving
factor.
The comparison with the EU and all of Western Europe makes for a slightly more
optimistic picture of the Euro’s effect on trade. The evolution of trade for Europe and
the EU naturally look similar to the Euro, as these are largely the same countries.
However, trade among Euro countries has decreased slightly less (relatively) than trade
between EU or all Western European countries. The caveats to this result are that the
positive Euro effect here is too small to be statistically significant, and also that trade
intensity among Euro countries had a slight positive pre-trend in the years before the
formation of the Euro.
In Figure 2(b), we plot the same relationship, only now directional exports is the de-
pendent variable, and equation 2.2, which also includes importer*year and exporter*year
interactive FEs in addition to country-pair FEs. The picture is a bit different, but the
conclusion we can draw is much the same. In this specification, trade did increase
substantially after the formation of the Euro, but trade among EU and all European
countries changed by exactly the same amount compared to 1998, the last year prior to
the Euro. However, on the other hand, in this specification, the Euro countries experi-
enced less of a positive pre-trend than the other countries. This suggests that, relative
to trend, the Euro might have actually had a positive impact on trade. However, one
9
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Figure 2: The Euro Impact vs. the EU, Europe
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the
Euro, vs. those that eventually joined the EU, and vs. all of Europe. I.e., it plots annual gravity
dummies from equation 3.1. The red bar denotes the last year prior to the formation of the Euro, 1999.
All country-pairs with at least 40 observations are used as controls, and this exercise only includes
non-Warsaw Pact countries. Panel (b) provides the same comparison, only using directional exports as
the dependent variable, importer and exporter*year interactive FEs, from model 2.2.
can only arrive at this conclusion by including pre-trends in the data, and, once again,
this difference is not large enough to be statistically significant. Also, the size of the
trend differential is likely to be roughly an order of magnitude smaller than the 50%
estimate favored by GR (2016).
An alternative approach is to note that since the most natural control group for
Euro countries are other countries in Europe (or EU countries), if we re-run each of our
models using only data for European countries (Figure 3, i.e., we drop data for other
continents from the regression), the picture looks less sanguine. We find that there is
no more trade between Euro-Area countries relative to trade with the rest of Europe in
2013 as compared with 1998, the last year pre-Euro, in either specification. In panel
(b), in the version of the model with directional exports as the dependent variable, it
actually appears that trade in Euro Area countries had declined slightly by 2013 relative
to 1998. Of course, this amount is far from being statistically significant. This does raise
another problem – our estimated standard errors are actually larger than what many
people would find to be an intuitively plausible effect size. This makes it more likely
than not that any significant measured effect will simply be spurious. Note that, even in
this last specification, if we simply include a dummy for trade before and after the Euro,
we will get a spurious positive result for the Euro, since trade did increase significantly
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in the Euro countries from 1950 to 1965. This increase was far too early to have been
due to “anticipation effects”. If we estimate from 1965 instead, the estimated effect will
shrink (which we show in our panel regressions below).
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Figure 3: The Euro Effect by Year, with Europe as Control Group
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the
euro vs. the rest of Europe, using equation 3.1. All European countries with at least 40 observations
are used as controls. Panel (b) uses the model with Importer/Exporter*Year FEs as in equation 2.2.
3.1.2 Eastern European Euro Entrants
Given the vastly different history of the former Warsaw Pact countries which joined the
Euro later, we consider the Eastern European countries separately in Figure 4. In panel
(a), we plot the evolution of trade between countries that eventually joined the Euro
from Eastern Europe during our sample – Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and Estonia
(who joined in 2007, 2009, and 2011) – and the original Euro entrants using the bilateral
trade specification in equation 3.1. Trade growth was slow in the years following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, yet has trended up since the mid-1990s. This upward trend
long pre-dated the decisions of these countries to join the Euro. Next we use as the
control group other Eastern European countries that did not join the Euro, or which
joined much later. Thus, we choose Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Croatia as our control countries.
In panel (b), we add in annual dummies for these countries’ trade with the original
Euro entrants (also including Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and Estonia), effectively to
control for trends in trade between Eastern and Western Europe. What we find is that
much of the trend is gone, and that, compared with 2007, trade actually declined in
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most of the years thereafter. However, we also find very large standard errors, and so
in the end we conclude that we cannot say much other than that the significant impact
we get in panel (a) is gone. In the appendix (Figure 16) we do a version of this model
using bilateral trade as the dependent variable and get similar results, except that in
that case, the trend goes away completely. Thus we conclude that the case for a large
Euro effect on trade for the Eastern European countries is sensitive to the control group
used.
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Figure 4: Eastern European Euro Entrants
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the
EMU from 2007 to 2011 – Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and Estonia – and prior EU entrants using
equation 3.1, and using the full sample as controls. Panel (b) adds in a control group using annual
dummies for trade between a larger number of Eastern European countries, some of whom joined the
Euro later and others not at all – Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Croatia.
3.1.3 The Euro: Panel Regression Results
Next, we move to a panel regression approach so that we can definitively answer whether
the Euro effect is statistically significant pooled across years, and report the results in
Table 3. In this table, we use equation 2.1 (using bilateral trade as the dependent
variable) in the first three columns and equation 2.2 (which uses directional exports
instead), in the following four columns. In column (1), we benchmark the results from
GR (2016). In column (2), we add in EU*Year and Eastern Europe-Euro Area*Year
interactive fixed effects, using the same control group as in Figure 4. We also add in
multi-way clusters. When we do this, the impact of the Euro is approximately cut in
half, and the standard errors increase slightly. In column (3), we limit the control group
to Western Europe, and also include a simple time trend control and limit the period to
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after 1975 when the trend starts, as is implied by Figure 3(a). We find that this trend
control eliminates the significance of the Euro.
Table 3: How Robust is the Euro Effect on Trade?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GR (2016) +Controls W.Europe GR (2016) +Controls W.Europe Post-1965
EMU Dummy 0.42∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.089 0.43∗∗∗ 0.055 0.12 0.032
(0.054) (0.066) (0.067) (0.083) (0.069) (0.079) (0.068)
Ever EMU*Year 0.0078
(0.0039)
Observations 375643 375412 7216 877736 877736 24337 18205
Dep.Variable Bil.Trade Bil.Trade Bil.Trade Exports Exports Exports Exports
Sample World World W.Europe World World W.Europe W.Europe
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the
average of 4-way log bilateral trade flows, and in the last four columns it is the average of exports
from country 1 to 2 reported by country 1 and reported by country 2. The first three columns
include country-pair and year fixed effects, while the last four columns include Importer*year,
Exporter*year, and country-pair FEs. In column (1), errors are clustered by country-pair in
parentheses, and by country-pair and year from column (2). Column (1) replicates the results
from Glick and Rose (2016), Table 2 column (4). Other controls, including GDP and GDP per
capita, and dummies for regional trade agreement and currently a colony are omitted for space.
Columns (2) and (5) add EU*year and EE-Euro Area*Year interactive FEs. Columns (3), (6), and
(7) limit the control group to Western Europe. Columns (3) includes a control variable for trends
in trade for countries that eventually joined the Euro. Columns (3) and (7) limit the sample to
the post-1975 and post-1965 periods, respectively.
Next, in column (4) we use the model with unilateral exports, and replicate the
results from GR (2016), Table 5 column 5, only adding in multi-way clusters, by both
country-pair and year. This alone reduces the t-score by 75% (GR reported errors of
.02 vs. .083). When we add in the same EU*Year and Eastern Europe-Euro Area*Year
interactive controls as in column (2), we get a point estimate of .055 (roughly 5%), but
with a standard error of .069. In column (6), we limit the sample and control group
to Western Europe (and drop the controls). This time we get a point estimate of 12%,
although not significant. In column (7), following the logic learned from plotting our
data in Figure 3(b), we limit the sample to the post-1965 period, and find that that the
point estimate shrinks to just 3%, again imprecisely estimated.
To conclude, in this section we found that the Euro impact on trade is sensitive to the
control group chosen, and can thus be eliminated even without including time trends.
We conclude from all these exercises that the Euro Effect on trade is not robust, and that
earlier large positive impacts conflated the Euro with the long history of European trade
integration, the EU, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Eastern
Europe to trade. And since the Euro observations constitute 29% of all the CU switches
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with time series variation, we believe this section alone casts significant doubt on the
overall “currency union effect”.
3.2 UK Currency Unions
In GR (2002), 26 of the 136 CU switches in the sample involved the UK. In GR (2016),
slightly over a third of the CU switches in our data set are of currency unions involving
the British Pound.
In this case, since most country-pairs with time series variation in CU status exhibit
just one change in status, a dissolution, a panel regression in levels with no controls for
trends could be prone to finding correlations even when a true relationship does not exist.
The basic problem can be seen in Figure 5(a) below when we compare the evolution of
trade between the UK and its former colonies vs. the UK and countries with which it
used to share currency unions with (adding yearly dummies to equation 2.1).15 There
is a lot of overlap between the two, as all but one country that shared former currency
unions with the UK in this sample were also former colonies, while nearly half of the
former colonies had currency unions (30 of 67). The trend for each is negative, consistent
with the gradual decaying of former colonial trade ties as stressed by Eichengreen and
Irwin (1998), Head et al. (2010), Head and Mayer (2013) and Campbell (2010). In
addition, many of the currency unions were dissolved during the Sterling Crisis in the
late 1960s. Thus, if one naively takes an average of trade in the 1950 to 1968 period, and
compares it with trade thereafter, one will conclude that the currency union dissolution
caused the decline in trade. If one includes a simple trend for UK trade with its former
colonies, by contrast, one will not find a correlation between CUs and trade.
However, with our new, much larger data set, many of the observations of countries
which used the pound did not necessarily involve the UK. Running the second version
of our model with directional exports as in equation 2.2 in Figure 5(b) on all UK CUs,
we find that trade did decline after, although the decline in trade happened much later,
starting in the late 1980s, while most of the dissolutions happened in the late 1960s.
Thus, the timing appears suspicious.
Next, we run panel regressions in Table 4, using the regression in equation 2.2 for
the first three columns and the model in 2.1 in the last two columns. We separate out
the Pound CUs involving the UK from the others. In column (2), we add in UK-UK
Colony*Year FEs, and another set of annual FEs when both countries are UK colonies,
15. Indeed, both of the lines plotted come from 2013, who claimed to have “solved” the Glick and
Rose puzzle.
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Figure 5: Trade and the Pound
Notes: Panel (a) plots the evolution of gravity dummies over time between the UK and its former
colonies, compared to the evolution of trade between the UK and countries with which it shared a
currency union (from a gravity regression with only time FEs). Panel (a) is from a model with bilat-
eral trade as the dependent variable and includes year and CPFEs. Panel (b) includes all Pound CUs
(including those not involving the UK), and uses the model with directional exports as the dependent
variable and includes importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects (and thus has many more observa-
tions). Panel (a) uses just the original GR (2002) data. The net decline in CUs each year is a bar chart
with magnitude on the left axis. A coefficient near unity in 1997 indicates that trade was (=exp(1)-1)
approximately 170% larger than one would otherwise expect.
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and the coefficients on both UK CUs and other Pound CUs both shrink moderately.
Next, we limit the sample to the pre-1990 period, as suggested by Figure 5(b), and
find that the UK CUs are no longer significant. Turning to the model using bilateral
trade as the dependent variable (equation 2.1), we find that the Pound increased trade
among those who used it by a magical 153% (=exp(.93)-1). If true, this would imply
that adopting the Pound might have quite large effects for not just trade, but also for
welfare, growth, and development. However, when we included our controls from column
(2) in Column (5), the ostensible trade elixir now appears to reduce trade by a sizeable
16%, although imprecisely estimated. The non-UK Pound CUs admittedly provide the
best evidence for the CU effect, although, as we see, the significance of these depends
on the specification.
Table 4: British Pound Currency Unions and Trade: How Robust?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark +Controls Pre-1990 Benchmark +Controls
UK CUs 0.54∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.13
(0.039) (0.15) (0.13)
Pound CUs (ex-UK) 0.56∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.045) (0.13) (0.13)
British Pound 0.93∗∗∗ -0.17
(0.12) (0.12)
Observations 877736 871392 368103 426507 372625
Dep.Var. Exports Exports Exports Trade Trade
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable in the first
three regressions is log exports, and is log trade in the last two columns. The
first three columns include Importer*Year, Exporter*Year, and Country-Pair
FEs. The last two columns include country-pair and year FEs. Column (1)
reproduces the specification from GR (2016), Table 5 (equation 2.2). Column
(2) adds in controls as described in the text. Column (3) additionally limits the
sample to the pre-1990 period. Column (4) uses equation 2.1, and benchmarks
GR (2016), Table 2. Column (5) adds in the same controls as columns (2) and
(3).
3.3 US Dollar-based Currency Unions
We begin by plotting the pretreatment and post-treatment trends of exiting and entering
dollar unions in Figure 6. The graphs are created by re-running equation 3.1 on annual
dummies indicating how many years before or after a change in CU status. What we
see is that, reassuringly, there is not much of a long-term “pre-treatment trend” before
exits, although trade did fall a lot in the last year of the currency union. However, after
exit, within 5 years, country-pairs on the dollar traded significantly more than in the
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last year prior to exit. Thus, dollar exits appear to foster trade (spurious, in our view)
but nevertheless constitute a counterexample.
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Figure 6: The Effect of Dollar Entrants and Exits
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually exited the
dollar, using equation 2.2. Panel (b) shows the evolution of gravity dummies for the sample of countries
that began using the dollar.
The entrances do not tend to show much, although there appears to have been trade
collapses about five years prior to entry. Indeed, on the whole, even Glick and Rose do
not find that US Dollar CUs increase trade. Once again, we would argue that this result
is another reason to doubt a large CU effect in other settings.
3.4 Australia CUs
Australia shared currencies unions with several small Pacific islands. Thus, we begin
by simply plotting trade for several of these islands to try to understand the factors
which might be driving the results. Figure 7(a) plots trade between Kiribati and Tonga,
who exited a currency union in 1990, and compare it to trade between Kiribati and
Fiji, which were never in a currency union. Indeed, we see that trade between Kiribati
and Tonga was much lower in the year of dissolution and thereafter, even relative to
the “control” of Kiribati and Fiji, matching the theory of Glick and Rose. However,
in Figure 7(b), when we separate out imports to Kiribati from Tonga vs. exports, we
see that this ostensible trade collapse was driven by missing data. There are only four
readings for Kiribati imports from Tonga in the data set, and each one reports similar
values. The results are drive by exports from Kiribati to Fiji only being recorded for the
date pre-dissolution. Each time they were recorded, they were at a much higher level
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than imports.
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Figure 7: Missing Data Drive “Collapse” in Kiribati-Tonga Trade
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade between Kiribati and Tonga vs. Kiribati and Fiji.
Kiribati and Tonga ended their currency union in 1990. After, trade was lower. Kiribati-Fiji might
be a good control, but its data is missing in 1990 and 1991. In panel (b), we disaggregate Kiribati-
Tonga trade into imports and exports. There were no years in which both exports and import data was
recorded.
Next, we repeat the exercise we did for the US, and plot annual indicator dummies
for years before leaving an Aussie CU (there are no entrants) in Figure 8(a). While we
see little action after dissolution, there happens to be a trade collapse during the CU
period starting about 10 years prior to dissolution, which culminates in the year before
dissolution. After dissolution, trade stabilizes. Thus, once again, Australian CUs appear
to be another counter-example, and one in which a simple dummy strategy in a panel
regression in levels will provide misleading inference.
Thinking about an appropriate control group for Australian CUs, and obvious control
country could be New Zealand. Thus, in Figure 8(b), we run the same regression only
limiting the control group to all countries that ever used the Australian dollar plus their
trade with New Zealand. This time, the trade collapse ten years prior to dissolution is
much less pronounced, and is no longer statistically significant.
Lastly, we run a few panel regressions based on equation 2.1. In column (1), we
replicate the GR (2016) benchmark from their Table (2), column (4). In column (2),
we simply restrict the Kiribati-Tonga trade to Kiribati imports, since we have this data
recorded before and after dissolution. This small change alone shrinks the magnitude of
the impact by about 6%, and also increases the error by about 3%. In column (3), we
add in several other mild controls, the log of total exports for each country (ex-bilateral
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Figure 8: Australian Currency Unions
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which had currency unions with
Australia (Tuvalu, Tonga, and Kiribati) after separation, using equation 2.2, and using the full sample
as controls. Panel (b) looks uses these countries’ trade with New Zealand as the main control.
trade), and total imports (also ex-bilateral trade). These mild controls further reduce
the coefficient by another 8%, at which the coefficient on Australian currency unions
is only significant at 10%. In column (4), we add in country*year interactive FEs for
each of the countries that have Aussie CUs – Australia, Tonga, the Solomon Islands,
and Kiribati. This time, we get a negative coefficient, albeit with large standard errors.
Finally, in column (5), we create a matching sample, limiting to these countries trade
between each other and New Zealand. Now the estimate returns to a fairly large 20%,
albeit once again imprecisely estimated.
Table 5: Australian Currency Unions and Trade: How Robust?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Data Adjustment Add Controls Add CPFE Matching Sample
Australian Dollar 0.84∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.70∗ -0.049 0.20
(0.37) (0.40) (0.38) (0.46) (0.21)
Observations 426952 426945 426272 426272 175
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each regression includes country-pair fixed effects,
and errors clustered by country-pair in parentheses. Other controls, including GDP and
year FEs omitted for space. Columns (2) and (3) substitutes Kiribati log imports from
Tonga in place of total trade. Column (3) uses trade between the Solomon Islands and
Tonga with New Zealand as the matching control group.
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3.5 The Demise of French and Portuguese Currency Unions
In our sample, France had two currency unions with time-series variation in the data,
and Portugal had five. However, in all of these cases, the end of these currency unions
was coterminous with often violent wars for independence. The tamest of these was
Morocco, where independence was granted following widespread anti-colonial rioting.
Each of Portugal’s colonies that shared currency unions – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe – had to fight for their independence.
In Guinea-Bissau, the war for independence ended with a Marxist takeover in which
the opposition was slaughtered. It is simply unimaginable that, in cases like this, the
currency had a large negative effect on trade, but that a communist takeover of the
government did not affect trade at all. Thus, in our panel regression results in the next
section, we will test whether the results are sensitive to dropping this sample.
3.6 The Rupee Zone
Next, we turn our attention to the Indian Rupee zone. As mentioned in the introduction,
this is another example of a CU effect perhaps driven by endogeneity. This is true not
just for India and Pakistan, which fought a war in 1965, which also likely affected trade
between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh and India ended their currency union
in 1973, just following the Bangladesh Atrocities, after which 10 million Bengalis took
refuge in India. These massive events likely overshadowed the impact of a change in
currency union status.
Our first exercise is to plot a yearly dummy variable for country pairs which had ever
shared the Rupee in Figure 9(a) (analogous to equation 3.1). We find a negative trend
in trade from the early 1950s to 1965, when several Rupee unions first dissolved (the
other two dissolved in 1969 and 1971). Again, this is something of a counterexample,
as it implies that trade declines during currency unions. However, when we exclude the
observations involving war in panel (b), the pre-trend becomes much less prominent,
particularly relative to large standard errors. Indeed, in panel (b), it appears there is
no discernable effect of leaving the Rupee, although if anything, trade appeared to be
slightly higher in many years after dissolution relative to the last year before the Rupee
union unwound.
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Figure 9: The Rupee Zone
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries over time which shared the
Rupee. The vertical red line indicates the dissolution of four of these unions, with two others dissolving
in 1969 and 1973. Panel (b) excludes India and Pakistan.
3.7 The CFA Franc Zone
We plot the evolution of trade between Comoros and Cameroon, who dissolved their
currency union in 1993, vs. Comoros and Nigeria, the latter of which was never part of
the CFA in Figure 10(a). After the dissolution, trade was lower on average. However,
trade between Comoros and Nigeria also fell, despite no CU dissolution. Next, in panel
(b), we break up trade for Comoros and Cameroon into imports and exports. We see
that, in fact, Comorian imports actually increased after dissolution – another counterex-
ample – but that exports were only recorded after dissolution. These were always at a
lower level than the one import reading available before dissolution. Thus, there is a
reason to be concerned that missing data might be driving the apparent large impact of
the CFA Franc on trade as well.
Next we plot the evolution of CFA Franc trade before and after dissolution (Figure
11(a)), and entrance (Figure 11(b)).16 We find, once again, that the timing of the trade
collapse in the case of exits is a bit odd. There is a significant, and massive, decline in
trade from 15 to 5 years before dissolution. After that, trade was relatively flat before
and after dissolution. The timing of the trade decline, and subsequent recovery post-
dissolution, suggests that the CFA constitutes another counterexample, even though a
simple dummy variable regression approach will find that trade flows were significantly
higher in the pre-dissolution period. The trade dynamics for entrants in panel (b), on
16. Once again, here we are using model 3.1.
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Figure 10: Missing Data Drive the “Collapse” in Trade
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade between Comoros and Cameroon, who ended their CU
in 1993, vs. a control group of Comoros and Nigeria. In panel (b), we disaggregate Comoros-Cameroon
trade into imports and exports. We see that Comorian imports actually rose after dissolution, and that
there is no Comorian export data before.
the other hand, admittedly does provide suggestive evidence for the proposition that
currency unions increase trade. However, even then, the dynamics look questionable, as
bilateral trade was roughly the same 15 years after the CU as there was before.
Next, in Table 6, we test the impact of the CFA Franc using a panel data regression
approach as in 2.1. In column (1), we benchmark the results in Table 2 column (4) of GR
(2016). In column (2), we exclude the trade collapse that took place more than 5 years
before the end of CUs, effectively comparing trade in the last 5 years of a CFA Franc
relationship to the period after. The coefficient shrinks to .29 with a standard error of
.34 and is thus insignificant. In column (3), we limit the control group to Africa, and
include separate dummies for the CUs more than 5 years before dissolution. In column
(4), we exclude observations where either import or export data is missing. In fact, in
this case, the coefficient actually increases slightly, although so does the standard error.
In column (5), we add in Africa*Year FEs instead. In column (6), we use the second
model (equation 2.2) with exports as the dependent variable, and include our separate
dummies for the CFA observations more than 5 years before dissolution. In column (7),
we additionally limit the sample to Africa. The main message here is that, while we do
not necessarily have a favorite specification, the original estimates of .89 and .72 is not
robust, even if the point estimate is still large.
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Figure 11: Impact of CFA Exits and Entrances
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of trade before and after exits into the CFA Franc using equation
3.1. Panel (b) shows the evolution of trade before and after entrances.
Table 6: The CFA Franc and Trade: How Robust?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Benchmark +Controls Only Afr. +Controls Ex-Missing Model 2 Only Afr.
CFA Franc 0.89∗∗∗ 0.29 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.75∗∗ 0.36
(0.33) (48.2) (0.35) (79.9) (98.4) (0.35) (0.41)
Observations 376176 375412 20240 313088 313149 871392 41762
Sample Full Full Africa Full ex-Missing Full Africa
Dep. Var. ln Trade ln Trade ln Trade ln Trade ln Trade ln Exp. ln Exp.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The first five columns include country-pair and year
fixed effects. Column (1) includes errors clustered by country-pair, and columns 2-5 include
errors clustered by country-pair and year. Columns (6) and (7) include errors clustered by
country-pair. Column (1) replicated Table 2 column (4) from GR (2016). Other controls,
including GDP, GDPPC, and dummies for RTAs and Currently a Colony are omitted for
space. In column (2), we added in controls for total exports and imports (ex-bilateral trade).
3.8 Concluding Thoughts on Disaggregated CUs
In this section we looked at CUs involving the Euro, the British Pound, the US dollar, the
Australian dollar, French and Portuguese CUs predating the Euro, and the CFA Franc
zone. In total, these CUs accounted for around 92% of the CUs in the GR (2016) sample.
(We leave out the East Caribbean Currency Area and the “Other” CUs, as GR (2016)
also did not find a significant positive effect for either.) Essentially nowhere did we find
robust evidence of a CU effect, and, on the contrary, we found many counterexamples.
CFA entrances and Pound CUs not involving Britain probably give the most hope, but
even in both of these cases the evidence is mixed.
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4 Panel Regressions
Next we turn to panel regressions, employing what we have learned in the previous
section, and test how robust the apparent large impacts of CUs, both for individual CUs
and overall, is on trade.
4.1 Importer/Exporter-Year Interactive Fixed Effects
First, we run the following regression, very similar to equation 2.2 but with disaggregated
CUs:
ln(Xijt) =
K∑
k=1
αkCUkijt + βZijt + λit + ψjt + δij + ijt, (4.1)
where Xijt is exports from i to j at t,17 CUkijt is a 0/1 dummy for currency union k status
(examples include the Euro, the Pound, etc., of K=9 unions total), λit are exporter-year
interactive FEs, ψjt are importer-year interactive FEs, δij are country-pair FEs, and
Zijt are a number of other controls. These other controls include dummies for current
colonial status and regional trade agreements.
We estimate this model in Table 7. In column (1), we benchmark the results from
Glick and Rose Table 5 (right panel), which uses robust standard errors. Note that each
disaggregated currency union ostensibly has a widely-varying impact on trade. If we
interpret this as a causal relationship, then it would be a major puzzle, as the Eastern
Caribbean CU apparently reduced trade by 81% (exp(-1.64)-1), while the French Franc
apparently increased trade by a staggering 139%. If, however, these effects are driven
by endogeneity, omitted variables, and the non-random nature of CU formation and
dissolution, then this is simply noise and not a puzzle, as different historical factors
drove the formation of each individual currency union. In column (2), we add in multi-
way clusters, by country-pair and year. This tends to cause standard errors to increase
substantially, as the error on the EMU increases from .021 to .086. The Australian Dollar
and the Indian Rupee unions are now no longer statistically significant. In column (3),
when we exclude the CU observations in which switches were associated with warfare
or missing data, as in Campbell 2013 (see Appendix Table 1), we find that impact
of the French Franc shrinks from 140% (exp(.87)-1) to just 48%, and no longer has a
statistically significant impact. Several of the other coefficients change radically – the
rupee goes from a coefficient of .52 (with a standard error of .32), to an impact of -.079,
for a decline of trade of roughly 8%. However, the apparent impact of the CFA Franc
17. In fact, it is the average of exports from i to j at t reported by i and the same flow as reported by
j. When only one country reports the value, that value is used rather than an average.
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actually increases to .9, for an increase in trade of 146%. Once again, we believe the
most likely explanation for these disparate results is the non-random nature of currency
union switches.
In column (4), we add in a number of intuitive controls meant to capture the various
factors discussed in the previous section. These include (a) UK Colony*year interactive
fixed effects, (b) Ever UK colony*year FEs, (c) year*Ever EU effects, to control for a
dynamic EU effect (thus we ask, what was the impact of the Euro relative to the EU?),
(d) a Eastern Europe-EU*Year interactive control (as discussed above in Section 3.1.2)
(e) A dummy to capture the trade collapse of CFA exiters more than 5 years before
dissolution. The result of including these controls is that none of the currency unions
by themselves have surviving significant positive impacts on trade with the exception of
the CFA Franc and the British Pound, both at just 95% rather than the 99% estimated
by GR (2016). However, the coefficient on the CFA Franc, at .75, is too large to be
believed, and we also previously found that when we limit the control group to Africa,
the point estimate turns negative. When we aggregate into the EMU vs. all other
currency unions in column (5), we once again see that neither currency union grouping
has a significant impact on trade. When we combine all currency unions together in
column (6), we get a point estimate of .051, or about 5%, albeit imprecisely estimated.
We would caution, though, that aside from the large errors here, there is likely to be
remaining endogeneity and omitted third factors which could cause this estimate to be
biased upwards or downwards. All we claim from this exercise is that the Glick and Rose
estimate that currency unions increase trade by 40% (using the Importer and Exporter-
year interactive FEs model with country-pair FEs as well), is sensitive to the inclusion
of intuitive controls. We make no claim that even this regression is free from additional
omitted variables and endogeneity – quite likely it is. We actually prefer the analysis in
the previous section, which also suggests there is scant evidence that individual currency
unions had a significant positive impact on trade.
4.2 Country-Pair Fixed Effects Regressions
Next, we run the following country-pair fixed effects (CPFE) regression:
ln(Tijt) =
K∑
k=1
αkCUkijt + βZijt + γt + δij + ijt, (4.2)
where Tijt is bilateral trade between country i and j at time t, CUkijt is a 0/1 dummy
for the status of currency union k between country i and j at time t, γt are year FEs,
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Table 7: How Robust is the CU Impact on Trade? (Full Suite of FEs)
GR Benchmark Cluster Ex-War +Controls More Agg. Overall
EMU 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.075 0.071
(0.021) (0.086) (0.085) (0.071) (0.071)
CFA Franc 0.58*** 0.58** 0.90*** 0.75**
(0.100) (0.24) (0.31) (0.35)
East Caribbean CU -1.64*** -1.64*** -1.64*** -1.68***
(0.11) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21)
Aussie 0.39** 0.39 0.36 0.34
(0.20) (0.41) (0.42) (0.40)
British Pound 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.22**
(0.034) (0.096) (0.10) (0.093)
French Franc 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.39 0.46
(0.083) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31)
Indian Rupee 0.52*** 0.52 -0.079 -0.064
(0.11) (0.40) (0.49) (0.47)
US Dollar -0.051 -0.051 0.031 0.031
(0.063) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
Other CUs -0.10* -0.10 -0.39 -0.40
(0.058) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)
Non-EMU CUs (ex-War, Missing) 0.040
(0.089)
CUs (ex-War, Missing) 0.051
(0.064)
Observations 877736 877736 871392 871392 877736 877736
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the average of log exports from
country 1 to country 2 reported by each. Each regression includes country-pair and Importer*year
and Exporter*year interactive fixed effects. Other controls, including a dummy for regional trade
agreements and currently a colony are omitted for space. Column (1) replicates Table 5 column (6)
of Glick and Rose, 2016. Column (2) clusters the errors by both country-pair and year. Column (3)
excludes the CU observations in which switches in status are coterminous with major geopolitical
events or missing data. Column (4) includes a number of additional intuitive controls. Columns (5)
and (6) use the same controls as in column (3), only aggregating the currency unions into the EMU
vs. all others in column (5), and all currency unions together in column (6).
δij are country-pair FEs, and Zijt are a number of other controls. These other controls
include standard gravity arguments, including bilateral GDP, bilateral GDP per capita,
total exports and imports of both country pairs (ex-bilateral trade), dummies for current
colonial status, regional trade agreements, and also dummies for whether a country is a
sovereign nation or not.
In Table 8 column (1), we replicate Table 2, column (4) of GR (2016). In the second
column, we add in a number of intuitive controls, and also multi-way clustered errors,
the latter of which only have a mild impact in this case. The additional controls include
dummies for sovereign nations, and also total exports to the rest of the world (of both
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countries summed) and total imports from the rest of the world (of both countries
summed; both figures are ex-bilateral trade). While these sound like mild controls, they
have a dramatic impact on about half of the coefficients. The coefficient on Indian
Rupee goes from 1.7 to 1.39, and the coefficient on “Other CUs” goes from 1.15, and
highly significant, to just .73. The coefficient on East Caribbean CU goes from -.24 to
-.85, and significant. In column (3), we exclude the CUs in which changes in CU status
were coterminous with warfare or another significant geopolitical event. This kills the
impact of the Indian Rupee, as it removes the CU between India and Pakistan. It also
turned out that the dissolution of all three of the French CUs with countries that have
GDP data happened to have been coterminous with warfare. Column (4) includes a
number of intuitive controls, analogous to Table 7 column (3). In column (4), the only
CU which is still significantly positive is the EMU. This is also true in column (5), when
we additionally exclude the CUs in which switches in CU status are coterminous with
missing data. In this case, the coefficient on the British pound is reduced to an imprecise
-.17, quite distinct from the estimates we had in Table 7.
Next, in Table 9, we compare the country-pair fixed effects estimates on all currency
unions aggregated together from various estimates in the literature, and our new esti-
mates. In Glick and Rose (2002), the authors found a coefficient on currency unions
of .65, implying a near doubling of trade, precisely estimated with a t-score of over 15.
However, Campbell (2013), using the same data, found that the coefficient fell to just
.11, and imprecisely estimated, when (1) year FEs were included (these alone actually
shrank the impact significantly), (2) CUs with switches coterminous with wars or miss-
ing data were excluded, and (3) a trend control for UK trade with its former colonies
was included. In this case, we have also clustered the errors by both country and year,
which do not make a major difference. Column (3) benchmarks the results from GR
(2016), which greatly expanded the sample and again implied a doubling of trade. How-
ever, when we exclude the war CUs and observations coterminous with missing data in
column (4), and also include a number of intuitive controls (including UK Colony*year
interactive FEs), the coefficient on currency unions falls to just .11, and once again
imprecisely estimated. When we separate the effect into the EMU vs. the non-EMU
CUs, once again the GR (2016) results benchmarked in column (5) are not robust in
column (6) when we omit the war CUs and add other controls in column (6). While it
might seem a suggestive coincidence that both columns (2) and (4) imply a still-large
impact of currency unions on trade close to 11%, neither are precisely estimated, while
Campbell (2013) also found that including trend controls yield an impact of -5%, while
Table 7 yields an estimate of 5%. Clearly, these are noisy estimates which are likely to
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Table 8: How Robust is the CU Impact on Trade? (CPFE Regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GR 2016 +Controls, MWCs Ex-War +Controls Ex-Missing
EMU Dummy 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.054) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
CFA Franc Zone 0.72∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.29 0.71
(0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.35) (0.50)
East Caribbean CU -0.24 -0.85∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28)
Australian Dollar 0.81∗∗ 0.66 0.63 0.088 0.090
(0.37) (0.42) (0.43) (0.47) (0.57)
British Pound 0.93∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.17
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
French Franc 1.00∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.14)
Indian Rupee 1.70∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 0.79 0.22 -0.019
(0.55) (0.57) (0.94) (0.38) (0.26)
US Dollar 0.093 0.093 0.058 0.10 0.25
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20)
Other CUs 1.15∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.56 0.42 0.19
(0.35) (0.34) (0.53) (0.56) (0.57)
Observations 426507 425836 375196 375115 372625
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the average of 4-
way log bilateral trade flows. Each regression includes country-pair and year fixed
effects. In column (1), errors are clustered by country-pair in parentheses, and by
country-pair and year from column (2). Column (1) replicates the results from
Glick and Rose (2017), Table 2 column (4). Other controls, including GDP and
GDP per capita, and dummies for regional trade agreement and currently a colony
are omitted for space. Column (2) adds in multi-way clusters, and additional
control variables, including total exports (ex-bilateral exports) for both countries,
dummies for sovereignty. Column (3) excludes CU switches coterminous with
warfare. Column (4) adds in the additional controls mentioned in the text. Column
(5) excludes CU switches coterminous with missing data.
be influenced further by additional controls.
4.3 Pre- and Post-Treatment Trends
One of the major findings in Campbell (2013), also repeated in GR (2016), was that
there are clear pre- and post-treatment trends. This indicates non-random treatment
and suggests the need to control for dynamics. First, we plot the pre- and post-treatment
trends (before and after CU exit/entry) in Figure 12 using the GR Table 5 specification
using exports as the dependent variable. Similar to Campbell and GR, we again find
that trade had fallen a significant amount in the last five years of a CU in Figure 12(a),
and that trade had increased about 40% in the last 15 years before a CU was formed in
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Table 9: The Currency Union Effect over Time: Booms and Busts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GR 2002 Campbell 2013 GR 2016 +Controls GR 2016 +Controls
Strict Currency Union 0.65∗∗∗
(0.043)
CU (Ex-War, Missing) 0.11
(0.11)
Currency Union 0.63∗∗∗ 0.11
(0.067) (0.073)
EMU 0.41∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.054) (0.068)
Non-EMU CUs 0.75∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.099) (0.11)
Observations 216941 216941 426507 372611 426507 372611
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each regression includes country-pair FEs (CPFEs).
Column (1) benchmarks the baseline estimate from GR (2002), absent year FEs. Column
(2) benchmarks the results (absent trend controls) from Campbell (2013), and includes year
FEs. Columns (3) and (5) benchmark the CPFE results from GR (2016). Columns (4) and
(6) omit the CUs in which switches were coterminous with war or missing data, and also
includes other intuitive controls.
(Figure 12(b)).
What happens to the pre- and post-treatment trends when we exclude the “war” CUs,
and missing data, and include our controls? In Figure 13, we explore just that. In this
case, there is no pre- or post-treatment effect for CU exits. For entrances, there is still
a suspicious jump in trade the last three years before a CU Entrance, and some further
increase after entry, although the average increase is still fairly volatile, and comes with
large standard errors (six years after entry, trade had not increased). We read this as
a likely indication that we have not quite controlled for all forms of endogeneity with
the entrances. However, we also do not necessarily see a pressing need to control for
dynamics, as the pre- and post-treatment trends seen in Figure 12 are largely gone in
Figure 13.18
5 Conclusion
To conclude, we find that the apparent large impact of currency unions on trade is driven
by third factors, and is sensitive to intuitive controls. Once the EU is controlled for, the
Euro does not appear to have a significant positive impact on trade. The apparent large
18. Nevertheless, we provide additional dynamic regression results in the Appendix in 7.1, which show
that the apparent impact of CUs on trade is also sensitive to dynamic specifications, including running
the specification in log changes or including a lagged dependent variable.
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trade impact of nearly every other individual CU breaks, often badly, once one (1) plots
the pre- and post-treatment trends, (2) restricts analysis to reasonable control groups,
(3) excludes CUs coterminous with war, missing data, or some other large geopolitical
event, and (4) clusters the standard errors. A limitation of our study is that even we
do not believe we have removed all sources of endogeneity or controlled for all possible
omitted variables in our panel regressions, so that our final insignificant results could
still be biased in either direction.
Although a surprising amount of resources in terms of economists have been devoted
to this question, we believe it has been an avoidable distraction, and deserves to be a
textbook case-study of the dangers of non-random treatment. One reason to have been
skeptical initially is that the magnitude of the measured effect – a doubling of trade
– is simply too large to be believed and does not square with related results in the
literature. For example, Irwin (1998) finds that the Smoot-Hawley tariff was estimated
to have decreased trade by 4-8%. How plausible is it that CUs have an impact 12-
20 times larger? Particularly since Klein and Shambaugh (2006) found that indirect
currency pegs – more likely to be random – are also not correlated with higher trade
flows. Indeed, even GR implicitly assume that hard pegs at par values other than 1:1
have no effect on trade. We believe our results are reasonable since there is no theoretical
or intuitive reason to expect that there is anything special about a 1:1 par value vs., for
example, a 1.2:1 par. Our findings can also help explain why different CUs appeared to
have wildly different impacts on trade – the results are simply spurious, and not robust
in any case.
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Figure 14: Trade Collapses following CU Dissolutions, which follow Wars
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of trade over GDP between India and Pakistan, who dissolved
a currency union as the same time as a brutal border war. In panel (b), Kenya and Tanzania ended
their currency union amidst the Liberation War and overthrow of the Dictator Idi Amin. In panel
(c), Portugal and Angola ended their currency union after a bloody civil war resulted in a communist
takeover. In panel (d), it can be seen that after Guinea and Mauritania ended their currency union in
1968, trade was not even recorded again for another two decades.
35
Appendix Table 1: List of Switches Coterminous with a Major Geopolitical Event (from Campbell, 2013)
Last Year Year(s) of
Country-Pair of CU Other Events Description
1. United Kingdom-Zimbabwe 1966 1965; 1964-1979 Independence and Trade Sanctions; Rhodesian Bush War
2. France-Algeria 1968 1954-1962; 1965; 1968 War of Independence; Assasination; Military Consolidation of Govt.
3. France-Morocco 1958 1956 Moroccan Independence following Anti-Colonial Rioting
4. France-Tunisia 1957 1956 Tunisian Independence granted after separatist bombings
5. Portugal-Angola 1975 1961-1975 Angolan War for Independence followed by Civil War
6. Portugal-Cape Verde 1976 1962-1974 Cape Verde part of Guinea-Bissauan War of Independence
7. Portugal-Guinea-Bissau 1976 1962-1975 War for Independence; Marxist takeover, opposition slaughtered
8. Portugal-Mozambique 1976 1964-1975; 1977-1992 War for Independence; Civil War
9. Portugal-Sao Tome and Principe 1976 1974-1975 Declared Independence following Coup in Portugal
10. Bangladesh-India 1973 1971 The Bangladesh Atrocities; 10 million Bengalis Take Refuge in India
11. Burma (Myanmar)-India 1965 1965 India-Pakistan war in 1965
12. Burma (Myanmar)-Pakistan 1970 1965; 1971; 1978 Indo-Pakistani Wars; Myanmar expels 250,000 Muslims
13. Sri Lanka-India 1965 1965 India-Pakistan war in 1965
14. Sri Lanka-Pakistan 1966 1965 India-Pakistan war in 1965
15. India-Pakistan 1965 1965 Border War, repeated conflicts thereafter
16. Côte d’Ivoire-Mali 1961; 1984 (start) 1968; 1980s Coup in Mali in 1968, movement from Socialism to Free Enterprise in 1980s
17. Kenya-Tanzania 1977 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War and overthrow of Idi Amin
18. Kenya-Uganda 1977 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War and overthrow of Idi Amin
19. Mauritania-Niger 1973 1974 Military Coup in Niger; Nationalization of mines in Mauritania
20. Mauritania-Senegal 1973 1974; 1975; 1978 Nationalization of Mines in Mauritania; Invasion of Western Sahara; Coup
21. Mauritania-Togo 1972 1974; 1975; 1979 Nationalization of Mines in Mauritania; Invasion of Western Sahara; Coup
22. Tanzania-Uganda 1977 1978-1979 Liberation War and Overthrow of Idi Amin
23. Madagascar-Senegal 1981 1982-present; 1989-1991 Low-Grade Civil War in Casamance Region; Senegal-Mauritania Border War
24. India-Mauritius 1965 1965 India-Pakistan war in 1965
25. Pakistan-Mauritius 1966 1965 India-Pakistan war in 1966
26. Madagascar-Reunion 1975 1976 Anti-Islander Rioting in Mahajanga
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Figure 15: The Euro Effect by Year (Europe as Control Group)
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the
euro vs. the rest of Europe, using equation 2.2. All European countries with at least 40 observations
are used as controls. Panel (b) adds in country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 10: Impact of the Euro: Post-1990 Data Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GR, CPFE +Controls GR, I/M*Year FEs +Controls
EMU Dummy 0.095∗∗ 0.080 0.41∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.036) (0.046) (0.049) (0.052)
Observations 252877 223636 489298 489298
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is
the average of 4-way log bilateral trade flows. Each regression in-
cludes country-pair and year fixed effects. Column (1) reproduces
the results from GR (2002). Column (2) reproduces the results from
Campbell (2014). Column (3) replicates the results from Glick and
Rose (2017), Table 2 column (4). Column (4) includes the controls,
data adjustments, and multi-way clusteres from the previous table.
Other controls, including GDP and GDP per capita, and dummies
for regional trade agreement and currently a colony are omitted for
space. Column (2) adds in multi-way clusters, and additional control
variables, including total exports (ex-bilateral exports) for both coun-
tries, for countryseparating GDP by country 1 and country 2, and .
Columns (2), (5), and (6) include controls for country-pair trends for
countries with time series variation in CU status. EMU = European
Monetary Union. “CUs, Ex-War, Missing” means Currency Unions
in which the changes are not associated with war or some other major
geopolitical event or missing data.
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Figure 16: New Euro Entrants
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the
EMU from 2007 to 2011, using equation 2.2, and using the full sample as controls. Panel (b) looks at
just the Eastern European entrants – Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and Estonia, and uses a control
group of Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Croatia.
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Figure 17: Impact of CFA Exits and Entrances
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of trade before and after exits into the CFA Franc using log
directional exports as the dependent variable (equation 2.2. Panel (b) shows the evolution of trade
before and after entrances.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries which eventually joined the euro.
The red bar denotes the year the Euro was formed, 1999. I.e., it plots annual gravity dummies from
equation 3.1. All country-pairs with at least 40 observations are used as controls. Panel (b) compares
this measure to gravity dummies for all European countries, and countries which would eventually join
the EU.
7.1 Additional Results on Dynamics
On the whole, figure 13 does not necessarily imply a pressing need to take a dynamic
approach, as excluding the CUs coternminous with wars and missing data, and adding
in other controls mostly eliminated the pre-treatment trends. On the other hand, panel
(b) suggests this might be advisable. Thus, next we show our main result – that the
impact of CUs on trade is not statistically significant – holds up even when we add in
a lagged dependent variable. We do this for both the GR specification in Column (1)
in Tables 7 and 8, and to our preferred specification in Column (6) of the same tables,
which excludes the CU switches coterminous with wars and missing data, and adds in
controls such as the “Ever EU*Year” interactive FE. Thus, in column (1) of Table 12,
we add in lagged log bilateral trade as a control variable to the regression in equation
2.1. Of course, since this equation also includes fixed effects, this will induce Nickell
Bias (Nickell (1981)). However, Nickell showed that this bias will be small in a long
panel. Thus, we limit to panels with T>40, which happens to make no difference to
the key coefficients, but gives us an average panel of 50 years, long enough to provide
an upper bound on the bias which is relatively small.19. In column (1), a coefficient
of .21 implies a long-run impact of 56% (=.21/(1-.63)). In column (2), however, when
we add in our controls and exclude the War CUs and those with missing data, we get
an impact of 8.3% (=.024/(1-.71)), although not statistically significant. Columns (3)
and (4), which use the directional exports instead of bilateral trade as the dependent
variable, and which also control for Importer*Year and Exporter*Year FEs, points to
19. For reasonably large values of T, the formula for the bias is approximately −(1+ρ)(T−1) . In this case,
the bias is approximately -1.63/49=.033.
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similar conclusions: the effect of CUs on trade is not robust.
Table 11: Adding a Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 +Controls Model 2 +Controls
Currency Union 0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.011)
L.ln(Trade) 0.63∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.015)
Currency Union (ex-War, Missing) 0.024 0.021
(0.024) (0.024)
L.ln(Exports) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0034)
Observations 246165 208128 456315 456315
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable in the first
two columns is log bilateral trade and log directional exports in the last
two columns. The first two columns include country-pair and year FEs,
and the latter two add Importer and Exporter*year FEs. Column (1) adds
in a lagged dependent variable to the GR (2016), Table 2 specification.
Column (2) adds in a number of controls, and limits the CU observations
to those ex-War and missing. Column (3) adds in a LDV to the specification
in Table 5 of GR (2016). Column (4) adds in in a number of controls, and
limits the CU observations to those ex-War and missing.
Table 12: Dynamic Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Trade) ln(Trade) ln ∆ Trade ln(Exports) ln(Exports) ln ∆ Exports
Currency Union 0.25∗∗∗ -0.0077 0.18∗∗∗ -0.0032
(0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.0067)
L.ln(Trade) 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.016)
CUs (ex-War, Missing) 0.052 0.031
(0.037) (14.2)
L.ln(Exports) 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.013)
Observations 392148 351303 351303 783749 783749 716727
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable in the first two columns is bilateral
trade, the log change in bilateral trade in the third column, log bilateral exports in columns (3)
and (4), and the log change in bilateral exports in column (6). Each regression includes country-
pair FEs (CPFEs). Column (1) benchmarks the baseline estimate from GR (2002), absent year
FEs. Column (2) benchmarks the results (absent trend controls) from Campbell (2013), and
includes year FEs. Columns (3) and (5) benchmark the CPFE results from GR (2016). Columns
(4) and (6) omit the CUs in which switches were coterminous with war or missing data, and also
includes other intuitive controls.
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Figure 19: Impact of CU Exits and Entrances; Over Time
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of trade before and after CU exits using equation 3.1. Panel (b)
shows the evolution of trade before and after entrances, ex-EMU.
7.2 Additional Plots of Trade (cut material)
Figure 20(b) shows the evolution of bilateral trade between Sri Lanka and Mauritius.
This highlights two related problems: first, while trade was generally lower after the
1966 currency union dissolution, suspiciously there was no trade recorded for the entire
1960s. Secondly, the trade data pre-dissolution which does exist suggests that trade had
been plunging for years. Thus, trade growth was actually faster in the period without a
currency union. Campbell (2013) also found that if one omits CU switches coterminous
with missing data, that the estimated results tend to shrink, and, secondly, that CU
status does not predict trade growth.
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Figure 20: The Rupee Zone
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the trade intensity of countries over time which shared the
Rupee. The vertical red line indicates the dissolution of four of these unions, with two others dissolving
in 1969 and 1973. Panel (b) looks uses these countries’ trade with New Zealand as the main control.
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